This paper presents an assessment of development banks' investment in urban sanitation between 2010 and 2017. It reveals an overall increase in investment, yet this falls short of bridging the significant financing gap in the sector. The paper also assesses the major areas of investment to show that, on the infrastructure side, 20 times more money is invested in sewerage than faecal sludge management, while on the enabling environment side, institutional capacity building is the most financed area. Using a new pro-poor assessment tool, an appraisal was made of the extent to which the investments were pro-poor. This analysis indicates that over half of investments, where an assessment could be made, were considered to be pro-poor, yet the use of the assessment tool reflects a lack of information within development bank reporting on the pro-poor nature of investments. Going forward, improving how development banks report on the pro-poor character of their investments would be a useful step for helping the sector assess the effectiveness of investments. The paper concludes by arguing that, despite progress, development banks should be even more ambitious in seeking to support pro-poor urban sanitation investments if the world is to overcome the urban sanitation challenge.
INTRODUCTION
Today, around four billion people live in cities and another 2.5 billion people will join them by 2050; 90% of these will be in Africa and Asia (United Nations ). Ensuring this population has adequate access to basic services like water, energy and sanitation represents the primary development challenge of the 21st century (Sclar et al. ) .
Arguably, the provision of sanitation represents the most intractable element of that challenge as it is estimated that there are still 2.2 billion urban people without a safely managed sanitation service, defined as one in which excreta is safely treated and/or disposed of off-site (WHO-UNICEF ). 674 million live without a basic sanitation service, meaning they do not have a facility that hygienically separates faeces from human contact (WHO-UNICEF ).
Those living in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa make up 63% of those without that basic level of service and, across those regions, 60 million people still openly defecate in cities (WHO-UNICEF ). Urban citizens living in close proximity to one another are particularly vulnerable to the health burden of poor sanitation (McMichael ), while poor sanitation has costs in terms of well-being (Bisung & Elliott ), reduced economic productivity (Hutton ) and physical security (Lee ) . Bank's mission is to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity, while the African Development Bank is committed to spurring sustainable economic development and social progress and, in all cases (at least of those development banks covered in this paper), they have committed to supporting the SDG agenda. That mandate means that they should support investments for the poorest segments of populations and, although such investments will still be assessed for economic viability, the explicit emphasis on advancing human development stands them apart from their commercial banking colleagues.
In the context of the urban sanitation financing gap, this paper sets out to examine the extent to which development banks meet their mandate for advancing urban sanitation for the urban poor. To do that, the paper reviews development bank investments in urban sanitation projects from the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals The paper delivers an assessment of trends and patterns in such investments and discusses some of the major gaps in reporting in this area. This contribution provides a novel analysis that will be useful for development banks, governments, researchers and other stakeholders, as they seek to assess the sector's performance for the world's poor and pick strategies that may deliver greater impact over the long term. The paper delivers on that agenda by first examining the concept and measurement of 'pro-poor sanitation', a term which is now widely used in the water and sanitation sector (WatSan) but vaguely defined (dos Santos & Gupta ) . A description of the review process is then given before the results and discussion are presented.
HOW CAN PRO-POOR URBAN SANITATION BE ASSESSED?
ex post evaluations of projects, the level of data and information presented in these was not sufficient to make such judgements in this way. Even if data were available, there would remain significant challenges, including ensuring that any evaluations are robustly implemented and comparable when trying to synthesise data. More fundamentally, there is also the issue of clarifying who constitutes 'the poor' as many definitions of poverty exist: people can be defined as poor if they live under a nationally defined poverty line, or if they earn less than the current globally defined poverty line, or by various other measures such as their daily calorie intake (for a review of measuring global poverty see: World Bank b). This leads to a related challenge that those defined as poor also changes over time, for example, during the implementation phase of a project. All this means that even if data were available, assessments of what constitutes pro-poor sanitation is a difficult task.
The only study the authors came across which attempts to make a similar assessment is the Newborne et al. () study into development bank investments in four utilities in Ghana, Tanzania and Burkina Faso. That work involves a detailed case study approach involving interviews, focus groups and a desk study providing a narrative of pro-poor ambition and project delivery and, while that study provides useful insight (as discussed later in this paper), the methods used are not appropriate for a review study. An alternative approach is therefore required that enables researchers to assess a much wider number of investments in a consistent fashion. For that purpose it is useful to examine what 'pro-poorness' means within the sanitation sector. The idea of being 'propoor' was first propagated within development contexts during the 1970s to explain policies that reduced economic inequality. It is now common for governments in developing countries to ascribe to pro-poor strategies in national development plans. For example, the Government of Bangladesh is committed to promoting a pro-poor macro-economic environment and pro-poor infrastructure development (IMF ).
Focusing on how pro-poorness is understood in the WatSan sector, Dos Santos & Gupta (, p. 24) argue that the sector has 'embraced the "pro-poor" concept as an alternative way to deliver services to the poor in line with the minimum international standards for improved WatSan facilities'. Here, the notion that pro-poor is an 'alternative', or better way, of delivering sanitation is considered pertinent.
Due to the failure of the sector to serve so many people with sanitation, especially the poorest in urban areas, 'propoor sanitation' stresses the need for changes in the way authorities and municipalities seek to serve the poorest. In practice, this materialises into sanitation policies and programmes that are characterised by one or more of the following features: Based on that logic, the researchers characterised key sanitation project and infrastructure design features and then developed an approach for assessing whether these features could be classified as either pro-poor, not pro-poor or unknown. This process involved deliberative and iterative engagement with a number of sanitation sector professionals and led to the development of a new assessment tool which became labelled as the 'pro-poor sanitation analytical decision tree' and an associated decision protocol.
In total, that covered 13 possible components of an investment in urban sanitation with these divided between infrastructure investments (wastewater treatment; sewerage; faecal sludge management (FSM) services; public toilets; communal toilets; household toilets) and what were called enabling environment investments (policy change; institutional capacity building; pro-poor unit; community capacity building; private sector support -FSM services; private sector support for toilets; and behavioural change) (see Table 1 for a definition of each).
For each category a decision pathway was developed (see Figure 1 ) that would lead to a classification of the investment as either pro-poor or not. Some investments were considered pro-poor by definition, such as community capacity building, as these initiatives are invariably delivered in the poorest communities and such activities are widely understood as part of the 'pro-poor sanitation paradigm'.
Yet, in many cases, whether an investment is pro-poor or not depends on the context of a particular project. For example, taking one project such as the Kerala Sustainable Urban Development Project (Asian Development Bank ) just on the infrastructure side, the project involved spend on wastewater treatment, sewerage, FSM and public toilets. Each project component would be assessed independently with a specified set of questions from the protocol for each area. Focusing on sewerage as an example, the first consideration is the area served by the sewerage network ('Network area') and, so, if geographically poor areas are not served, the investment cannot be considered pro-poor.
However, if geographically poor areas are served, the affordability of the service needs to be considered to determine if the investment is pro-poor. When assessing affordability, questions we focused on were whether users were expected to make payments, whether these payment means were appropriate and whether there was special consideration of less advantaged parts of the population. However, following that basic approach -which is further clarified belowthe tool was used as a basis for assessing the pro-poor character of development bank investments in urban sanitation from 2000 to 2017. The results from that exercise are reported on later in the paper following further clarification on the review process in the next section. Table 2 . Through a number of searchnarrowing iterations, the number of projects that were deemed appropriate for further analysis was eventually reduced to 138. Data from each project were then recorded in a central database. To enable fair comparison, all financial data were recorded as reported, and then inflated to 2016 and converted to US dollars using the 2016 average currency exchange rate.
The documents for each project were then reviewed and the analytical decision tree was used to analyse the extent to which different components of that project could be judged as being pro-poor in character or not. To promote consistency in this procedure, an application protocol was developed and a peer review process was instigated so that a project previously reviewed by one researcher was then also assessed by another. Although there were small differences in some judgements, these were not deemed to alter the overall data findings, and no adjustments were made. Table 3 , which also shows the high variance in the dataset (final column). In practice, this reflects the diversity of projects that development banks support, ranging from modest investments in small-scale pilot projects to citywide urban development programmes.
Out of 134 project budgets, 61 have a specified urban sanitation budget, whereas the rest has sanitation as a subcomponent of a larger budget line, usually involving water supply but sometimes solid waste and related areas. Looking at trends across the period, it was possible to conclude that both the overall budgets of projects that include sanitation, as well as the urban sanitation budget, have increased, the Number of projects we narrowed down using our initial search criteria of urban sanitation, which included drainage and solid waste management, as well as emergency documents. Focusing on different investment areas, the most common across all projects was institutional capacity building (76% of projects) followed by public toilets (58%), sewerage (57%) and wastewater treatment (54%) (see In attempting to assess the pro-poor character of investments, one of the major overarching findings was, too often, there was an extremely limited level of detail in project reports on specific pro-poor performance indicators or assessments of distributional outcomes across populations.
However, when taking our approach to assessing the propoor character of project design, it was still possible to assess 134 out of 138 project documents to support a classification of at least part of their investment as pro-poor or not pro-poor, but often this was only a partial assessment of the investment. In a best case scenario, detailed logframes, or similar planning frameworks, provided a sufficient level of transparency to use the decision tree to assess the propoor reach of an investment in urban sanitation, particularly when planned activities were accompanied with budget and beneficiary detail. It was therefore possible for some projects to assess the extent of investment going into different components and make inferences about whether that investment was pro-poor or not. Table 4 shows a summary of these data which are broken down to project components (which were often multiple per project) as this was the level at which the pro-poor assessment was made.
In total, across all areas where an assessment could be made and was supported by project budgetary information, US$1,895 million (55% of total) was considered pro-poor, US$810 million (24% of total) not pro-poor and US$651 (19% of total) unknown. Proportionally, investments in the enabling environment were more likely to be considered pro-poor (59% of total), while infrastructure investments were slightly less likely to be pro-poor (54% of total). Overall, the biggest areas for investment in terms of absolute investment were, respectively, sewerage, institutional capacity building and wastewater treatment. On the infrastructure side, despite being the biggest area of investment, sewerage investments are the least likely to be pro-poor with US$715 million (49%) of investments not pro-poor against US$691 million (48%) that were considered propoor. Also, on the infrastructure side, perhaps surprisingly, investment in wastewater treatment was more likely to be considered pro-poor than not (US$461 million, or 63%, against US$279 million, or 38%). More expectedly, investments in FSM services were also much more likely to be considered pro-poor than not ($41 million, or 61%, against $2 million, or 3%). In terms of proportionality, however, the most pro-poor category of investment was household toilets, with all investments in these considered to be pro-poor.
The largest area of investment on the enabling environment side was in institutional capacity building, with nearly US$600 million (64%) considered pro-poor against US$268 million (29%) which was not. For a number of categories, budgets were not available at the required level of granulation to allocate budgets (communal toilets, private sector FSM services or private sector toilets), meaning it was not possible to make any inferences about these investments. It is also noted that the pro-poor assessment tool is a necessarily subjective device based on interpretation of the pro-poor quality of project design principles and, as such, the data should be treated as indicative of trends rather than as absolute. However, in the context of limited assessments in this area, we believe the analysis and tool itself still constitute a valuable contribution to debates regarding the financing of urban sanitation. The evidence from this review, alongside broader research, Through the review, we also made inferences about the pro-poor nature of a significant amount of development bank investments, with our estimates suggesting that more than half of investments (56%) 'blended financing models' involving public finance and commercial finance. However, as the sector seeks to involve more commercial finance, we believe there will be an even stronger role for development banks and associated aid actors to robustly promote the pro-poor agenda in their lending, and so developing more widely recognised indicators and reporting systems connected to this agenda will grow in importance. Finally, the paper made assessments about the extent to which development bank investments were pro-poor or not.
WHAT WE KNOW AND DO NOT KNOW ABOUT DEVELOPMENT BANK INVESTMENT IN URBAN SANITATION

CONCLUSION
For this purpose, a novel pro-poor sanitation assessment tool was designed and applied that enabled us to make inferences about investments. We believe the design and approach of the tool may prove useful for our researchers considering how to make such assessments, but it is a reflection about the lack of specific pro-poor performance indicators within development bank reporting procedures.
Going forward, improving how development banks report on the pro-poor character of their investment would be a useful step for assessing the effectiveness of investments, but for now, our assessment provides an initial benchmark that development banks are more often than not investing in pro-poor sanitation. Despite this relative success, we urge these organisations to redouble their efforts and promote even more pro-poor investment as contemporary efforts are falling short of the transformational change that is needed if we are to overcome the urban sanitation crisis.
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